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Life Means Life, Maybe? An Analysis of
Pennsylvania's Policy Toward Lifers
When a court of common pleas judge in Pennsylvania strikes his
gavel and sentences a convicted felon to "life in prison without pa-
role," he is not being harsh-he is being redundant. This is be-
cause the Pennsylvania Parole Act of 1941,1 specifically, Section
331.21 of the Act 2 prohibits the Pennsylvania Parole Board from
granting parole to prisoners sentenced to life in prison ("lifers").
Pennsylvania is one of only four states which prohibits parole for
all lifers by denying the Parole Board the authority to consider
lifers for parole.3 Arguably, this has never posed a problem for any-
one other than the lifers and their families, but that may be
changing.
In recent years prison overcrowding has become an increasingly
perplexing problem. The situation in Pennsylvania has culminated
in court-mandated release of prisoners 4 and court ordered con-
struction of additional facilities5 to alleviate the problem. This
problem is exacerbated by the state's current fiscal stress. At an
average cost of $17,5091 per year to house, feed and provide medi-
cal care for each prisoner, fiscal responsibility requires a critical
analysis of Pennsylvania's policy of categorically denying parole to
lifers.
1. 61 Pa Stat § 331.1 et seq (Purdon 1964 & Supp 1991).
2. See note 57.
3. Julian H. Wright, Jr., Life-Without-Parole: An Alternative to Death or Not
Much of a Life at All, 43 Vand L Rev 529, 544-45 (1990). The other states are Wyoming,
South Dakota and Virginia. While other states have life-without-parole sentences, Wyo-
ming, South Dakota and Virginia are the only states that categorically deny parole for lifers
by restricting the jurisdiction of the Parole Board. Wright, 43 Vand L Rev at 544-45 (cited
within this note).
4. Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v Wecht, 565 F Supp 1278 (W D Pa 1983).
Judge Cohill ordered the immediate release of prisoners. Inmates of the Allegheny County
Jail, 565 F Supp at 1296-97.
5. Id at 1147-48. Judge Cohill ordered the jail to be closed and new facilities con-
structed. Id.
6. Department of Corrections; Planning, Research & Statistics Division, 1990-91 An-
nual Report. This figure does not include capital expenditures such as facilities. Estimates
of the yearly cost including capital expenditures are in the area of $25,000 per year per
prisoner.
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The need for this critical analysis becomes clear upon an exami-
nation of current trends in prison demographics. The Pennsylvania
lifer population has been increasing at a consistent rate for the last
twenty years. In 1971 the lifer population was 390.7 Twenty years
later that population had increased over 500% to 2,139.8 This com-
ment focuses on two factors contributing to this growth. Part One
considers whether the state's policy of denying parole to lifers ac-
curately reflects present legislative intent. Part Two considers the
almost total extinction of commutations of life sentences in recent
years.
This comment will conclude that Pennsylvania's policy against
parole for lifers is clouded by the haphazard manner in which the
legislature has passed seemingly conflicting parole and sentencing
statutes. The problem is further heightened by the inconsistent use
of the commutation system. The legislature must address this situ-
ation in a cohesive, constructive manner or the Pennsylvania pa-
role system will remain in its current state of contradiction and
instability.
I. No PAROLE FOR LIFERS-LEGISLATIVE INTENT OR LEGISLATIVE
ACCIDENT?
A. The Parole Act
Over the years, Pennsylvania attorneys 9 and judges 10 have often
mistakenly believed that lifers were eligible for parole. In fact, the
legislature may have contributed to this mistaken belief when it
passed certain sentencing statutes" which appear to be in conflict
7. Figure provided by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Available
through Planning, Research & Statistics Division.
8. Id.
9. See Commonwealth v Floyd, 506 Pa 85, 484 A2d 365, 370 (1984), where the prose-
cutor in asking for the death penalty improperly presented to the jury the possibility that
the convicted murderer could one day be paroled if given a life sentence. See also Common-
wealth v Aljoe, 420 Pa 198, 216 A2d 50, 56 (1966), where in a first degree murder case the
district attorney discussed the possibility of parole from a life sentence during closing
argument.
10. See Commonwealth v Pfender, 373 Pa Super 102, 540 A2d 543, 547-49 (1988),
where the trial court erroneously stated that a defendant sentenced to life in prison would
be eligible for parole in fifteen to twenty years.
See also Commonwealth v Scarborough, 313 Pa Super 521, 460 A2d 310, 316 (1983), where
the superior court noted that possibility of parole for a defendant sentenced to life in prison
was for the consideration of the Parole Board.
11. In particular, Sentencing Code, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9756(c) (Purdon 1982 &
Supp 1991). See note 56 and accompanying text. See also, Act of December 7, 1982, 1982 Pa
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with the Pennsylvania Parole Act of 1941.
This complex history of parole in Pennsylvania begins in 1909,
when the legislature passed Pennsylvania's first Parole Act. 12 This
initial parole legislation was modified by two 1911 provisions. The
first provision gave judges in courts of Quarter Sessions, Oyer and
Terminer the power to parole prisoners in county jails and work-
houses."3 The second provision extended parole considerations to
prisoners in state penitentiaries.14 Parole of these prisoners was
available upon the completion of a minimum sentence established
by the sentencing court.15 Where sentencing statutes did not estab-
lish minimum sentences, the courts were free to establish the mini-
mum. The 1909 and 1911 laws failed to establish separate stan-
dards of parole for lifers. A prisoner serving a life sentence was
eligible for parole in the same manner as a prisoner serving a lesser
sentence.
Judges who did not support parole established minimum
sentences nearly as long as the maximum sentence, effectively cir-
cumventing legislative intent.' In order to correct judicial circum-
vention of the parole system, the legislature again modified the pa-
role law in 1913.'7 Prisoners sentenced after July 1, 1911 became
eligible for parole upon completion of one-third of their maximum
sentence. 8 Subsequent acts in 192319 and 193120 further restricted
minimum sentencing discretion.2'
By 1941 this system was under severe criticism,2 2 and due in
Laws 811, where the legislature amended the arson statute and provided for a specific sen-
tence of "life imprisonment without parole." Crimes Code, 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 3301
(Purdon 1983 & Supp 1991). This seems to be superfluous if the parole board cannot parole
lifers. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
12. L. W. Kolakoski and T. W. Broecker, The Pennsylvania Parole System in Oper-
ation, 23 J of Crim L, Crim & Police Science 427 427 (1933).
13. Act of June 19, 1911, 1911 Pa Laws 1059, section 1.
14. Act of June 19, 1911, 1911 Pa Laws 812.
15. Id.
16. Kolakoski and Broecker, 23 J Crim L, Crim & Police Science at 427 (cited in note
12).
17. Act of June 19, 1913, 1913 Pa Laws 340.
18. Id.
19. Act of June 29, 1923, 1923 Pa Laws 397.
20. Act of June 22, 1931, 1931 Pa Laws 280.
21. The 1923 Act limited minimum sentences to one-half the maximum. Act of June
29, 1923, 1923 Pa Laws 397, section 6. The 1931 Act applied the 1923 limitation retroac-
tively. Act of June 22, 1931, 1931 Pa Laws 280, section 1.
22. See 1941 Legis J 5209, remarks of Senator Shapiro:
The worst thing you could pass would be even better than the situation which we
have, particularly in Philadelphia; I want to say of the man in charge of the Parole
Board in Philadelphia that he does a fine job, but he does not have the machinery,
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large part to this criticism, the Parole Act of 1941 was passed. 3
The Act established a uniform system for the administration of pa-
role in Pennsylvania. The new legislation created a parole board
(hereinafter "the Board") vested with the exclusive power "to pa-
role and reparole, to commit and recommit for violations of parole,
and to discharge from parole all persons theretofore or thereafter
sentenced by any court in the State to imprisonment in any penal
institution of the State or of a county.
24
The Board was originally composed of three members who were
appointed by the governor.2 5 The Board's jurisdiction did not ex-
tend to persons sentenced for a maximum period of less than two
years,26 nor to "convicts condemned to death or serving life impris-
onment. 2 7 The clarity of the jurisdictional provision of the Parole
Act has never been questioned even though it appears to be in con-
flict with Section 331.17, which states that the Board has the
power to parole all persons.2 s The Board's power to parole prison-
ers could not be exercised until the expiration of the minimum
sentence imposed by the sentencing court.29
The constitutionality0 of the Parole Act was almost immediately
challenged and upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v Cain.31 In that case, Elmer Banks was serving a
and he does not have the time with which to do the job that ought to be done and
that can be done. I am going to ask my colleagues to vote for this bill.
Id at 5214. The bill in question was the Parole Act of 1941. Act of Aug 6, 1941, 1941 Pa
Laws 861.
See also Senator Jaspan's comments about alleged abuse of judicial power in this area. Id
at 5210.
23. House Bill No 11 was introduced on January 14, 1941. 1941 Legis 90 (1941). The
bill was immediately sent to the House Committee on Judiciary General. Id. The House of
Representatives unanimously passed the original version on May 20, 1941. Id at 5558.
The House version was introduced in the Senate on May 21, 1941 and was immediately
sent to the Senate Committee on State Government. Id at 2531. The full Senate passed the
bill on July 11, 1941. Id at 5215. Interestingly, the Senate appeared to be less than thrilled
with the Parole Act, which passed 28-18. See debate, id at 283.
The House unanimously agreed to the Senate amendments on July 12, 1941. Id at 2505.
The Act went into effect on June 1, 1942.
24. Parole Act, 61 Pa Stat § 331.17 (Purdon 1964 & Supp 1991).
25. Id at § 331.2. Today, the Board is comprised of five members serving six-year
terms. Id.
26. Id at § 331.17.
27. Id at § 331.21.
28. Specifically, § 331.17 states, "The board shall have exclusive power ... to dis-
charge from parole all persons heretofore or hereafter sentenced by a court in this Common-
wealth." Id (emphasis added).
29. Id at § 331.21.
30. Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution.
31. 345 Pa 581, 28 A2d 897 (1942).
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two-year sentence in a state prison.32 The sentencing court di-
rected that Banks be paroled,3 3 but the prison warden 34 refused to
parole Banks before the date set by the newly established Board.
3 5
Banks obtained a writ of habeas corpus and the lower court found
that the Parole Act, which established the Board, was unconstitu-
tional. 6 The warden appealed.
37
Banks challenged the Parole Act on two grounds. His first argu-
ment was that the Act infringed upon the power of the governor to
grant pardons and commutations of sentences.3 8 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court answered that argument by drawing a distinction
between pardons, which it defined as the exertion of a state's right
to completely free a prisoner,3 9 and parole, which did not com-
pletely free a prisoner as he remained under the control of the pe-
nal authorities. 40 The court drew a further distinction between par-
dons and parole by analyzing which branches of the government
had control of the respective actions.
The court found that the power to grant pardons and commuta-
tions of sentences rested solely with the governor pursuant to Arti-
cle IV, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.41 Conversely,
the court added that parole had never been in the category of ei-
ther pardon or commutation in as much as the legislature had pre-
viously granted parole power to the courts.42 Since the state consti-
tution did not give parole power to the governor, the legislature
32. Cain, 28 A2d at 898-99.
33. Id at 899.
34. The defendant in this case.
35. Cain, 28 A2d at 899. The Board had been recently established by the Parole Act.
See notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
36. Cain, 28 A2d at 899.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Governor is granted the exclusive power to pardon and commute
sentences pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article IV, section 9. Id. At the time
of this attack on the Parole Act, similar statutes in ten other states had been attacked on a
similar theory. Id at 899 n 1. The argument had been rejected in each instance. Id.
39. Id at 899. "A pardon is the exercise of the sovereign's prerogative of mercy. It
completely frees the offender from the control of the state." Id.
40. Id.
A parole, on the other hand, does not obliterate the crime or forgive the offender. It is
not an act of clemency, but a penological measure for the disciplinary treatment of
prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation outside of prison walls. It does not set
aside or affect the sentence; the convict remains in the legal custody of the state and
under the control of its agents, subject at any time, for breach of condition, to be
returned to the penal institution.
Id.
41. Id at 900. See note 38.
42. Cain, 28 A2d at 900. See notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
1992
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inherently had the power to parole. Thus, the legislature had the
authority to shift parole power from the courts to the Board.
Bank's second constitutional attack on the Parole Act was that
the power to parole was an exclusive function of the judiciary.
43
The power to parole, therefore, could not be legislatively trans-
ferred to an executive or administrative body." The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court rejected this contention, 45 holding that the power
to grant parole was not inherent in the judiciary46 but rather was
inherent in the legislature's exclusive power over the penal sys-
tem.47 The court added that the granting of parole was purely ad-
ministrative in nature and the legislature may entrust the function
to non-judicial agencies.48
B. Sentencing Statutes
Following this initial ratification of the Parole Act, judicial scru-
tiny of the Act was infrequent.49 It appeared obvious that lifers
were ineligible for parole. The seed for today's confusion and in-
43. Cain, 28 A2d at 900. Article V, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states
that the judicial power of the Commonwealth is vested in the various courts:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system
consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court,
courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of
Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the peace.
All courts and justices of the peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judi-
cial system.
Pa Const, Art V, § 1.
44. Cain, 28 A2d at 900. Of course, this is exactly what the Parole Act accomplished.
See note 24 and accompanying text.
45. Cain, 28 A2d at 900. The court noted that this argument had also been rejected
by at least ten states. Id.
46. Id. Pennsylvania courts did not possess such power until 1911. Id. See notes 13,
14 and accompanying text.
47. Cain, 28 A2d at 900.
48. Id at 901. The court concluded that while the judiciary determines guilt or inno-
cence and the proper penalty, the manner of execution of the sentence is a legislative func-
tion which could be put into effect by administrative officers. Id.
While holding that the Act did not impinge upon judicial functions generally, the court
did hold that portions of Sections 331.21 and 331.24 were unconstitutional. Id. In particular,
the court held the provision of Section 331.21, which gave the Board power to extend the
period of parole beyond the maximum term imposed by sentence, and the provision of Sec-
tion 331.24, which gave the Board power to discharge a parolee before the end of his parole
period, unconstitutional. Id. The court held, "The fixing of the term of the sentence is ex-
clusively a judicial function." Id.
The dissent found that the Parole Act impinged on both the power of the governor and on
the judicial function of the courts. Id at 903-07.
49. The power of the Board has never been questioned on constitutional grounds af-
ter the Cain decision.
Comments
consistency regarding parole for lifers was planted in 1973 when
the legislature revamped the Sentencing Code.50 The reworking of
the Sentencing Code included a provision which appeared to ex-
tend parole eligibility to some lifers. This provision, Section
9756(c), stated:
(C) PROHIBITION OF PAROLE.- Except in the case of murder of the first de-
gree, the court may impose a sentence to imprisonment without the right to
parole only when:
(1) a summary offense is charged;
(2) sentence is imposed for nonpayment of fines or costs, or both, in
which case the sentence shall specify the number of days to be served;
and
(3) the maximum term or terms of imprisonment imposed on one or
more indictments to run consecutively or concurrently total less than
30 days.
This provision appeared to be in direct conflict with Section 331.21
of the Parole Act, which denied the Board jurisdiction over lifers:
The board is hereby authorized to release on parole any convict confined in
any penal institution of this Commonwealth as to whom power to parole is
herein granted to said board, except convicts condemned to death or serving
life imprisonment . . .51
Section 9756(c) of the Sentencing Code can be read as requiring
parole for lifers convicted of crimes other than murder of the first
degree.52 Section 331.21 of the Parole Act prohibits the Board from
considering for parole any person sentenced to life imprisonment
regardless of the underlying crime. While there appears to be an
obvious conflict between the two sections, the legislature provided
that the Sentencing Code would repeal any prior statutes which
were inconsistent with the new law.5 3 The question is whether Sec-
tion 9756(c) is actually in conflict with, and thus repeals, the in-
consistent portions of Section 331.21 of the Parole Act. Attempts
50. Originally placed in title 18 of the Pennsylvania Statutes, the Sentencing Statute
was transferred to title 42 in 1980. Act of Oct 5, 1980, 1980 Pa Laws 693, § 401(a).
51. Parole Act, 61 Pa Stat § 331.21 (Purdon 1964 & Supp 1991).
52. For example, a conviction of second degree murder carries a mandatory life sen-
tence. Authorized Disposition of Offenders, 11 Pa Stat § 1102 (Purdon 1983 & Supp 1991).
A mandatory life sentence is also imposed on any person convicted of third degree murder-
who has previously been convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter. Sentencing Code,
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9715 (Purdon 1982 & Supp 1991). The degrees of murder are distin-
guished at Criminal Homicide, 11 Pa Stat § 2501 (Purdon 1983 & Supp 1991).
53. The note to Sentencing Code, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9701 (Purdon 1982 & Supp
1991), states, "Section 2(b) of Acts 1974, Dec. 30, P.L.1052, No 345 provides that: 'An acts
and parts of acts are repealed in so far as they are inconsistent herewith.'"
1992
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by Pennsylvania courts to answer this question have been less than
convincing.
Prior to answering this specific question, however, Pennsylvania
courts were faced with two other apparently conflicting Parole Act
and Sentencing Code sections. In Commonwealth v Dorian,54 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court grappled with the potential conflict
between Section 9761(a) of the Sentencing Code and Section
331.21(a) of the Parole Act. The manner in which the courts ad-
dressed that conflict foreshadowed the courts' resolution of the ap-
parent conflict between Section 331.21 of the Parole Act and Sec-
tion 9756(c) of the Sentencing Code.
Dorian centered around Section 976155 of the Sentencing Code,
which permitted a judge to impose a second sentence which would
run concurrently with a prior sentence.56 The appellant-prisoner
contended that Section 331.21(a) of the Parole Act 57 prohibited the
54. 314 Pa Super 244, 460 A2d 1121 (1983). This was an appeal from a sentence for
burglary. Dorian, 460 A2d at 1122. The appellant was charged with criminal attempt, crimi-
nal mischief and burglary. Id. He pleaded guilty to burglary and the Commonwealth moved
to have the remaining charges dropped because they merged with the burglary. Id. The
lower court sentenced the appellant to six to twelve years in prison, the sentence to be
served concurrently with a prior sentence the appellant had been serving. Id. Motions to
modify or vacate the sentence were denied and this appeal followed. Id.
55. Sentencing Code, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9761 (Purdon 1972 & Supp 1991) states:
Computation and order of service of sentences
(A) ORDER OF SERVICE OF SENTENCES.-If a minimum sentence imposed by the court
which is to run concurrently with one which has been previously imposed would ex-
pire later than the minimum of such a previously imposed sentence, or if the previ-
ously imposed sentence is terminated before the expiration of the minimum sentence
of the last imposed sentence, the defendant shall be imprisoned at least until the last
imposed minimum sentence has been served.
Id.
56. Dorian, 460 A2d at 1124.
57. Section 331.21(a) states:
COMMISSION OF CRIME DURING PAROLE; OTHER VIOLATIONS OF TERMS OF PAROLE
(a) Convicted Violators. Any parolee under the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania
Board of Parole released from any penal institution of the Commonwealth who, dur-
ing the period of parole or while delinquent on parole, commits any crime punishable
by imprisonment, for which he is convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to
which he pleads guilty or nolo contendere at any time thereafter in a court of record,
may, at the discretion of the board, be recommitted as a parole violator. If his recom-
mitment is so ordered, he shall be reentered to serve the remainder of the term which
said parolee would have been compelled to serve had he not been paroled, and he
shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on parole. The board may, in its discre-
tion, reparole whenever, in its opinion, the best interests of the prisoner justify or
require his release on parole and it does not appear that the interest of the Common-
wealth will be injured thereby. The period of time for which the parole violator is
required to serve shall be computed from and begin on the date that he is taken into
668
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lower court from directing that his sentence for burglary be served
concurrently with an earlier sentence. The superior court rejected
this argument 58 and held that, to the extent Section 9761(a) of the
Sentencing Code and Section 331.21(a) of the Parole Act were in-
consistent, Section 331.21(a) was repealed.5 9 The superior court
found precedent for this holding in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision in Commonwealth v Zuber,e0 which "recognized"
that Section 9761 of the Sentencing Code had changed the prior
law.
6 1
Judge Johnson filed a dissent62 in Dorian, arguing that if the
General Assembly truly intended to change the longstanding policy
of Section 331.21(a) of the Parole Act it would have done so ex-
pressly.63 Failing to find an express intention, the dissent read the
two provisions consistently. 4
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the judg-
custody to be returned to the institution as a parole violator.
If a new sentence is imposed upon such parolee, the service of the balance of said
term originally imposed shall precede the commencement of the new term imposed in
the following cases:
(1) If a person is paroled from any State penal or correctional institution under the
control and supervision of the Department of Justice and the new sentence imposed
upon him is to be served in any such State penal or correctional institution.
2) If a person is paroled form a county penal or correctional institution and the new
sentence imposed upon him is to be served in the same county penal or correctional
institution.
In all other cases, the service of the new term for the latter crime shall precede
commencement of the balance of the term originally imposed.
Where the new term is to be served last, or the balance of the term originally im-
posed is to be served last, and such service is, in either case, to be had in any penal or
correctional institution under the control and supervision of the Department of Jus-
tice, any male person upon recommitment shall be sent.to the nearest Correctional
Diagnostic and Classification Center for service of the remainder of the original term
at such institution as shall be designated by the Deputy Commissioner for Treatment
of the bureau of Correction. Any female person shall be recommitted to the State
Industrial Home for Women at Muncy.
Parole Act, 61 Pa Stat § 331.21(a) (Purdon 1964 & Supp 1991).
58. Dorian, 460 A2d at 1123-24.
59. Id at 1124. The court relied specifically on the historical note to the Seritencing
Code, which requires the repealing of all inconsistent statutes. Id. See note 53.
60. 466 Pa 453, 353 A2d 441 (1976). The prisoner pleaded guilty to a murder he com-
mitted while on parole. The supreme court denied the prisoner's request for post-conviction
relief, which was based on an allegedly invalid plea bargain. Zuber, 353 A2d at 443.
61. Dorian, 460 A2d at 1124. By "law" the court meant Section 331.21(a). Id.
62. Id at 1125.
63. Id at 1127.
64. Id at 1125. Judge Johnson noted that Section 331.21a of the Parole Act dealt
specifically with parolees. Section 9761 of the Sentencing Statute more generally dealt with
multiple terms of imprisonment. Id at 1125-27.
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ment of the superior court. 5 In a per curiam opinion, the court
expressly disapproved of the lower court's "dictum""6 dealing with
the "implied" repeal of Section 331.21(a) of the Parole Act by Sec-
tion 9761(a) of the Sentencing Code. The supreme court, appar-
ently agreeing with Judge Johnson's dissent, held that Section
9761(a) of the Sentencing Code did not repeal Section 331.21(a) of
the Parole Act.
67
The Dorian holding is constrained to the specific sections of the
Parole Act and Sentencing Code in question. The case is impor-
tant, however, because the superior court specifically recognized
that an inconsistency between part of the Sentencing Code and the
Parole Act would result in the repeal of the inconsistent portions
of the Parole Act." The supreme court did not dispute this in its
holding and analysis 9 thus leaving the door open for the repeal of
other Parole Act sections by the Sentencing Code. Dorian further
reflects a judicial desire to find sections of the Parole Act and Sen-
tencing Code consistent at the expense of detailed analysis or
consideration.
C. The Castle decision
Section 331.21 of the Parole Act specifically prohibits the parole
board from granting parole to all lifers, including those serving life
sentences for crimes other than first degree murder.7 0 As noted
earlier,71 Section 9756(c) of the Sentencing Code limits sentences
without parole to convictions for first degree murder and certain
summary offenses while seemingly requiring judges to grant life
sentences with parole for other crimes.7 2 Whether the two provi-
sions conflict, resulting in the repeal of Section 331.21 of the Pa-
65. Commonwealth v Dorian, 503 Pa 116, 468 A2d 1091 (1983).
66. Dorian, 468 A2d at 1092. While the court referred to this portion of the superior
court's decision as dictum, the lower court's discussion on this point appears to be the pri-
mary holding of the case.
67. Id. The theory that Sections 331.21(a) and 9761 are not inconsistent continues to
be good law. See Rivera v Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 79 Pa Commw 558, 470
A2d 1088 (1984), and Zazo v Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 80 Pa Commw 198,
470 A2d 1135 (1984).
68. Dorian, 460 A2d at 1124.
See Judge Johnson's dissent, "I recognize that the clause repealing acts inconsistent with
the Sentencing Code would operate as an express repeal of prior legislation that is inconsis-
tent with its provisions." Id at 1125.
69. Dorian, 468 A2d at 1092.
70. See note 51 and accompanying text.




role Act, has been addressed in only one Pennsylvania case, Castle
v Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole.73
Franklin Castle was convicted of second degree murder and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment.7 4 He initiated procedures seeking pa-
role, 5 but the parole officer informed Castle that he was ineligible
for parole because he was serving a life sentence .7 Appellant then
sent a letter to the Board asking to be considered for parole.7 7 The
Board refused, citing Section 331.21 of the Parole Act, and Castle
appealed that decision to the commonwealth court.
78
The Board, by demurrer, argued that the appellant was serving a
life sentence and, therefore, could not be considered for parole
under Section 331.21 of the Parole Act.79 The appellant raised two
counterarguments. His primary contention was that he was eligible
for parole under Section 9756(c) of the Sentencing Code,80 which
he argued impliedly repealed Section 331.21 of the Parole Act.81 In
the alternative, appellant argued that at the time the Parole Act
was passed only first degree murder was susceptible to a sentence
of life imprisonment.8 2 Section 9756(c) of the Sentencing Code was,
therefore, consistent with the intent of the Parole Act because it
also denied parole only to those persons convicted of first degree
murder.8 3 Castle's second degree murder conviction, therefore,
would not bar him from parole.8 4
The commonwealth court did not address the second argu-
ment. 5 Instead, the court sustained the Board's preliminary objec-
tions, appellant's application for summary relief was denied, and
his petition for review was dismissed.86
The commonwealth court began its analysis by looking at the
purpose behind Section 9756(c) of the Sentencing Code 7 and
73. 123 Pa Commw 570, 554 A2d 625 (1989).
74. Castle, 554 A2d at 626. Appellant was also serving a concurrent life sentence for






80. Id at 628.
81. Id.
82. Id at 628 n 6.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The court merely noted the second argument in a footnote without comment on
its merit. Id.
86. Id at 629.
87. Id at 628.
1992
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found that it did not have as its stated purpose the creation of
parole eligibility. Furthermore, no reference was made in that sec-
tion to the power of the Board.8 8 Instead, Section 9756(c) dealt ex-
clusively with what a trial court may or may not do when imposing
a sentence in specific instances.8 9 In contrast, the court noted that
Section 331.21 of the Parole Act specifically prohibited the Board
from paroling prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment.90 Citing
the presumption against implied repeal,9' the court held that the
statutes were not clearly inconsistent.92 Therefore, Section 9756 of
the Sentencing Code did not impliedly repeal Section 331.21 of the
Parole Act.9 3 The court concluded that Section 9756(c) did not cre-
ate a right of parole for any lifers.94
D. Analysis of Castle
The Castle decision is clearly result-oriented and fails to ade-
quately analyze whether Section 9756(c) of the Sentencing Code
and Section 331.21 of the Parole Act conflict. The court's reliance
on the presumption against implied repeal serves as a weak crutch
on which to rest the proposition that the sections do not conflict
and merely sidesteps the apparently conflicting mandates of Sec-
tion 331.21 of the Parole Act and Section 9756(c) of the Sentencing
Code. The opinion makes a conclusory statement that the two stat-
utes are not "clearly irreconcilable"; 95 however, the court does not
give a clear explanation of how the provisions are to be recon-
ciled. 6 Arguably, three possible interpretations of these sections
can be supported.
1. The Castle Interpretation
The initial interpretation is the one reached in the Castle deci-
sion. Unfortunately, the entire reasoning of the Castle court is ex-
pressed in two sentences.9 7 However brief, the Castle decision is
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id at 628-29.
91. Id at 629, citing Pittsburgh v Public Utility Comm., 3 Pa Commw 546, 284 A2d
808 (1971).




96. See notes 87 and accompanying text.
97. Castle, 554 A2d at 629. See notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
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currently the only guidance offered by Pennsylvania courts on the
apparent conflict between Section 331.21 of the Parole Act and
Section 9756(c) of the Sentencing Code. The authors of this com-
ment are unable to further substantiate or expand the court's
holding.
2. The Sections Conflict
The Castle court could easily have held that the sections were
inconsistent, a result implicit in the plain language of the sections
themselves. The Parole Act expressly denies the Board the power
to parole lifers." The Sentencing Code permits courts to deny pa-
role only to prisoners convicted of first degree murder and certain
summary offenses." If the Sentencing Code is read as a grant of
parole rights to lifers not convicted of first degree murder, then the
conflict is obvious.
The Sentencing Code included a repeal provision: "All acts and
parts of acts are repealed in so far as they are inconsistent here-
with."100 According to this provision, if the two sections under con-
sideration in Castle are inconsistent, the earlier Parole Act restric-
tion on parole for lifers is repealed by the Sentencing Code. This
result would keep the Sentencing Code's prohibition on parole for
first degree murderers intact, but would require parole for lifers
sentenced for second or third degree murder. While it may be true
that the courts of Pennsylvania are traditionally hostile to implied
repeal,10' refusal to recognize the express repeal provision of the
Sentencing Code ignores legislative intent. This interpretation is
bolstered by both the superior court and supreme court's analysis
in Dorian that sections of the Parole Act are expressly repealed by
inconsistent sections of the Sentencing Code.1
0 2
Of course, it would not be entirely accurate to state that the leg-
islative intent is clear. Our review of legislative history failed to
determine whether the legislature was cognizant of the impending
conflict between the Sentencing Code and the Parole Act. 03 The
98. Parole Act, 61 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 331.21 (Purdon 1964 & Supp 1991). See notes
51-53 and accompanying text.
99. Sentencing Code, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9756(c) (Purdon 1964 & Supp 1991). See
note 50 and accompanying text.
100. Act of Dec 30, 1974, Pub L No 345, 1974 Pa Laws 1052, section 2(b).
101. Pittsburgh v Public Utility Comm., 3 Pa Commw 546, 284 A2d 808 (1971).
102. See note 67 and accompanying text.
103. A review of the appropriate legislative committee hearings may have shed light
on this issue. We were unable to obtain these materials from either local libraries or from
the Senate Library in Harrisburg.
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provision of Section 331.21 of the Parole Act denying the Board
power to release lifers has never been amended. 104 It seems likely
that when the Sentencing Code was being reworked, the legislature
did not consider the possible affect on the Parole Act.
In spite of the above, the courts are required to apply the provi-
sions as they have been written. The plain language of each sec-
tion, coupled with the repeal provision of the Sentencing Code,
could have sustained a vastly different holding in Castle. The Cas-
tle court could have found the sections in conflict, resulting in im-
mediate parole rights for lifers. This alternative holding is at least
as feasible as the actual holding the court reached in Castle.
3. The Sections Do Not Conflict
The final theory is that Section 331.21 of the Parole Act and
Section 9756(c) of the Sentencing Code are textually inconsistent,
but not legally inconsistent. 10 5 According to this final interpreta-
tion, the Sentencing Code does not repeal the Parole Act's restric-
tion on the Board's authority over lifers. Rather, the Sentencing
Code merely grants parole rights to those sentenced to life in
prison for crimes other than first degree murder without designat-
ing an administrative body to oversee the parole. Both sections can
be enforced and, therefore, are legally consistent.
Under this theory the Parole Act and Sentencing Code cover dif-
ferent interests, an analysis consistent with the Castle court's read-
ing of the statutes in pari materia.10 6 The Parole Act was a grant of
legislative authority to an administrative body, the Parole Board.
In granting that authority, the legislature withheld the power to
parole lifers. In contrast, the Sentencing Code is concerned with
judicial power and merely restricts sentencing discretion. Judges
are only permitted to deny parole rights to persons convicted of
104. An act authorizing the Parole Board to parole certain life prisoners was intro-
duced in the State Senate, SB 312, by Messrs. Johanson and Donolow on December 27,
1965: "An Act amending the act of August 6, 1941 (P.L. 861), entitled 'Pennsylvania Board
of Parole Law,' authorizing the release on parole for certain persons serving life imprison-
ment but prohibiting parole for those serving life imprisonment for homicide until fifteen
years of the sentence has been served." 1965 Legislative Journal-Senate 187. The bill ap-
parently died in committee as no further floor action on the bill could be found.
Section 331.21 of the Parole Act has been amended as recently as 1990. However, the
provision restricting authority to parole lifers was unaffected. Act of July 11, 1990, 1990 Pa
Laws 476.
105. Laws are legally inconsistent if the mandate or purpose of each law cannot be
obtained when both laws operate on the same individual simultaneously.
106. Castle, 554 A2d at 628 n 4.
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first degree murder or certain summary offenses unrelated to lifers.
Thus, these two statutes actually focus on two completely separate
issues: parole board power and judicial power. Because the sections
deal with different issues no conflict would exist.
The practical effect of this analysis does not alter the ultimate
result in Castle. While this theory would find lifers convicted of
crimes other than first degree murder eligible for parole, the Board
would still lack authority to grant parole. The legislative grant of
authority to the board is only partial, and the right to parole lifers
remains vested in the legislature. The result is that lifers are left
with a right to parole but no way of exercising that right.10 7 The
plausibility of this complex reading of the statutes only under-
scores the haphazard and patchwork manner in which the legisla-
ture has dealt with lifers.
II. COMMUTATIONS
Although currently ineligible for parole, lifers have been released
through commutations. The power to commute a sentence is con-
ferred on the governor by Article IV, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.0 8 A commutation is a conversion of a prisoner's min-
imum sentence to a shorter term.10 9 The Board of Pardons, which
is, in part, appointed by the governor, 10 hears prisoner petitions
and makes recommendations to the governor. The governor can
then either grant or deny the petitioner's commutation."' In the
case of lifers, this requires a conversion of the life sentence to a
term of years. After the prisoner serves the new minimum term, he
is eligible to be paroled by the Parole Board.
As with any program administered solely at the discretion of the
governor, the commutation system has been swayed by the chang-
ing political winds of the Commonwealth. Each governor's admin-
107. This interpretation leads to a possible due process claim by life prisoners. An
analysis of this claim goes beyond the limited scope of this comment.
108. Pa Const, Art IV, § 9 states:
(a) In all criminal cases except impeachment the Governor shall have power to remit
fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commutation of sentences and pardons; but
no pardon shall be granted, nor sentence commuted, except on the recommendation
in writing of a majority of the Board of Pardons, after full hearing in open session,
upon due public notice. the recommendation, with the reasons therefor at length,
shall be delivered to the Governor and a copy thereof shall be kept on file in the office
of the Lieutenant Governor in a docket kept for that purpose.
109. Black's Law Dictionary 254 (West, 5th ed 1979).
110. Administrative Code, 71 Pa Stat § 113 (Purdon 1964 & Supp 1991).
111. Thus, commutations are completely within the discretion of the governor.
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istration brings its own philosophy on the use of commutations.
The effect a change in administrations has on commutations can



























Shapp 1971 123 48
1972 122 51 1 50
1973 90 40 1 39
1974 78 29 2 27
1975 83 26 0 26
1976 73 27 6 21
1977 81 17 0 17
1978 83 23 10 13
Thornburgh 1979 93 15 13 2
1980 62 9 9 0
1981 43 9 9 0
1982 25 5 4 1
1983 43 12 11 1
1984 40 8 7 1
1985 45 11 11 0






The Shafer administration averaged 23.25 commutations per year,
the Shapp administration averaged 30.125, the Thornburgh admin-
istration averaged .625, and the Casey administration averaged
4.25 commutations per year. 113 While these statistics show a differ-
112. Statistics supplied by Pennsylvania Board of Pardons.
113. Numbers for the Shafer administration are provided for the years 1967-1971 only
because statistics were not kept by the Board of Pardons prior to 1967.
Numbers for the Casey administration do not include 1991 because the statistics for 1991
are not complete as of the writing of this article.
ence among all the administrations in the granting of commuta-
tions, clearly the sharpest distinction is between the Shapp and
Thornburgh administrations. The impact of this dramatic change
in commutation philosophy can be understood numerically by
studying the following table:
Table B




Average Commutations per yearl1 5:
1971-1978: 30.125
1979-1986: .625
Difference: 29.50 (Average increase
per year due to
change in policy)
Average increase per year
attributable to other factors: 15.46
One could conclude that the Shapp administration used the com-
mutation system almost as a parole substitute, whereas the Thorn-
burgh administration nearly ceased commuting lifers altogether.
The drop in commutations is the most significant factor in the
higher average increase per year in lifer population for the Thorn-
burgh administration vis-a-vis the Shapp administration. Over the
eight years of the Thornburgh administration, this amounted to
236 more lifers than if the Shapp administration average had been
maintained. The Casey administration has followed the Thorn-
burgh trend, granting only seventeen commutations from 1987
through 1990.116
What is the practical effect of this change in philosophy? The
total lifer population has been growing at a steady rate over the
last twenty years:
114. Statistics supplied by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
115. Statistics supplied by the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons.















The reduction in commutation is not entirely responsible for this
increase, but its profound effect cannot be easily dismissed.
The reduction in commutations is likely to cause the average age
of the lifer population to rise as more prisoners are required to
serve the full sentence. This aging population can not only be ex-
pected to require more cell space, but also more medical care as
the infirmities of old age appear." 8 The cost of housing and caring
for an increasing and aging lifer population only serves to heighten
the strain on an already stressed state budget.
III. CONCLUSION
While it appears that commutations may have been used by past
administrations as a substitute for parole for lifers, this is clearly
not the case today. Recent administrations have virtually closed
this avenue of release. The courts and legislature are left to deal
with the problems created by an increasing lifer population.
The problem of changing commutation policies is only relevant
because of the state's apparent policy against parole for lifers. The
patchwork manner in which the legislature has arrived at this pol-
icy has created difficult interpretation problems for Pennsylvania
courts. The Castle decision, with its utter lack of analysis, high-
lights this difficulty.
The tenuous reasoning in Castle leaves it open to future attack.
117. Population as of December 31 of each year. Statistics supplied by the Pennsylva-
nia Department of Corrections.
118. As these infirmities weaken the older prisoners, they must be separated from the
general prison population for their own protection. Telephone interview with Galina
Milohov, staff member of the Pennsylvania House Judiciary Committee (Feb 12, 1992).
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could at any time reverse Cas-
tle, and find Section 331.21 of the Parole Act and Section 9756(c)
of the Sentencing Code in conflict. This would lead to parole for
lifers, 119 whether that is the legislature's intent or not. This unsta-
ble situation benefits neither those in favor of parole for lifers nor
those opposed to parole. Parties opposing parole for lifers desire
clear legislation so that courts will not sua sponte interpret the
current legislation as allowing parole for certain lifers. Parties ad-
vocating parole for lifers 20 require a clearly defined legislative pol-
icy as the first step toward implementing the views they advocate.
This situation requires immediate legislative action. Until the
legislature addresses the instability, poorly considered decisions
like Castle will continue to be the norm. Regardless of whether the
legislature intends parole for lifers or not, the statutes need to
clearly reflect legislative intent. This can be done in two ways. The
legislature can either expressly reconcile the conflicting provisions
of the Parole Act and Sentencing Code or combine the two into a
unified system. Regardless of the method employed by the legisla-




119. At least those lifers not convicted of first degree murder.
120. In particular the Pennsylvania Lifers Association (PLA). The authors wish to ex-
press their gratitude to the PLA for explaining their views on this subject.
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